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
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LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

PREPARED FOR:
U.S. ARMY
TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

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developing doctrine, organizations, training, tactics, and equipment for LIC operations. The study recommends that the Army devote a significant portion of its resources to developing a new combat organization especially tailored to be effective in the low intensity environment. The study points out that the Army must overcome major internal and external barriers. The public must recognize and support the Army's commitment to evolutionary change and a pilot program be started for the future.

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PREFACE

As events unfold in the remaining two decades of the 20th Century, we cannot help but focus upon the enormous technological advances that have their roots in World War II and the shifting balances of power throughout the world. We can no longer rely upon the cliché of a bipolar model of superpower conflict, with all its attendant dangers, as the basis of a future world order.

Advances in technology -- and resultant weaponry -- are now widespread. It is no surprise to anyone that we cannot put the "nuclear genie back in the bottle." Yet, many of the resources we need to survive are only to be found in the Third World, thus creating counterbalances for trade and political stability.

Most frightening, is the fact that weapons of mass annihilation, including biological agents and nuclear explosives, are no longer the sole prerogative of world powers. We have come to realize that we cannot "slug it out" with nuclear weapons. Yet, we continue to allocate the bulk of our military resources to strategic missiles; and for reason of intellectual comfort, we insist on heavy conventional weapons and high technology in a World War II scenario.

We have yet to realize that our ability to cope with massive conventional conflict does not imply an ability to deal effectively with small wars throughout the world. (The hostage episode in Iran is an example.) Because tomorrow's contest will focus on

Third World resources, it is of utmost importance that we learn to cope successfully with limited -- at times unconventional -- conflict: proxy operations, psychological warfare, disinformation, deception, guerrilla operations, and terrorism.

This study is intended to set forth a conceptual framework for the Army's conduct of low-intensity warfare. Specifically, we deal with emerging missions for the Army, as well as with the organization and doctrine needed to fight in an unconventional environment.

The present study is limited -- it is a beginning, an initial survey of the emerging world of low-intensity conflict. Pursuant to our agreement with the Army, we start with the conclusions of the seven volume study "Strategic Requirements for the Army in the Year 2000," which Dr. William Taylor and I co-directed. Using the "Army 2000" study to define the parameters of "threat" against which we must plan, this study posits the probable nature of future combat, exploring the definitional, conceptual, operational and some of the training requirements needed to conduct low-intensity operations successfully.

Low-intensity conflict and unconventional warfare are terms bandied about freely, but which have not been adequately defined. Yet, there is a substantial literature concerning the subjects -- quite a few historical precedents, and a great deal of opinion. We have tried to synthesize opinion and fact, having posited definitions, and having built a conceptual framework. Obviously,

no pure method of analysis can be applied, nor is the literature sufficient to draw conclusions deductively. As a result, we are left only with the tools of inference and induction upon which to build the conceptual and operational bases of future low-intensity conflict.

The study was prepared under my direction with the active participation of Dr. William Taylor and Mr. David Williamson. An overview of the low-intensity warfare arena, written by Dr. J. Bowyer Bell, was commissioned so that we could calibrate qualitatively our approach to low-intensity conflict issues. The report was edited by Ms. Debra van Opstal with the aid of Mr. Paul Cole; their efforts proved invaluable.

Quite a few were kind enough to review the study. Specifically, we thank General Edward C. Meyer, Honorable James Woolsey, Mr. E.B. Vandiver, and Major General Donald Morelli for their critical review of the study. We thank the members of the Study Advisory Group and their staffs for their tempered and reflective judgments, and we thank Majors Michael Ferguson and Samuel McKenty for their helpfulness and their understanding of the difficulties involved in preparing the study.

Finally, we thank Ms. Ann Tennison and Ms. Therese Ettel for their patience and professionalism, as well as Ms. Brenda Wines for her assistance with project administration.

Robert H. Kupperman
June 1983

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Army today is facing an increasingly difficult set of interlocking decisions which will determine its ability to continue to be an effective instrument of U.S. domestic and foreign policy over the next several decades. The Army's dilemma is that the conflict least likely to occur -- extended conventional superpower hostilities in Europe -- nevertheless dominates Army thinking, training, and resource allocation. The hostilities most likely to engage the Army's attention will be those small but critical low-intensity conflicts proliferating at the periphery of the great powers; whether indigenous or externally driven, many of these conflicts -- or protoconflicts -- engage important U.S. interests -- in the Gulf, in the Caribbean, in Africa, in the southern Pacific, and potentially, even within the U.S. itself. This low-intensity conflict environment is not one for which the Army is currently prepared; the major emphasis has been on Army support of in-place governments, against insurgents with the presumption that the guerrillas are Soviet or Soviet-inspired. The range of political probabilities is much broader, and to meet successfully the foreseen challenges at this low end of the violence spectrum the Army will require new doctrine, organization, tactics and equipment.

KAI recommends that the Army devote a significant

fraction of its resources to developing a new line combat organization especially tailored to be effective in the low-intensity environment. This organization would emphasize the ability to operate as an independent, integrated, self-sufficient force in situations ranging from domestic law and order crises through counterterrorism here and abroad to extended, proactive operations outside the U.S. These military capabilities point toward a whole new range of equipment, much of it different from the present interoperable NATO gear, and most visibly toward acquisition of more integral Army aviation for transport, penetration, and strike. The ability to operate in neutral or hostile areas for long periods without a logistical umbilical underlies new doctrinal and training requirements: low-intensity conflicts are seldom "won" in the conventional sense of superior force imposing conditions upon a defeated enemy; understanding and exploiting that characteristic places high premiums on psychological warfare, language skills, mature attitudes, and political sensitivity.

In restructuring to meet the focus of the future, the Army must overcome major internal and external barriers: NATO, DoD, Congress, and the public must all recognize and support the Army's commitment to evolutionary change. It behooves the Army to begin immediately to educate these constituencies to develop the institutional and doctrinal framework for the new combat organization, and to begin its independent equipment development and acquisition

programs. A single politically courageous and psychologically definitive action is strongly urged to establish the Army's direction and determination: commit today to the conversion of the high technology division to a light low-intensity combat organization that, through hands-on experience, will be the pilot for all future Army LIC doctrine, tactics, equipment, and training requirements and developments.

FOREWORD

Forecasting the world environment of the 1990s provides a guide to the most likely forms of conflict in that decade. The forecast on which this study depends is derived from two previous studies, both done by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies: "The Future of Conflict in 1980s" and "Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000" ("Army 2000 Study"). Both of those studies conclude that, as the end of the 1980s approaches, the demands on Army capabilities -- collectively and upon the individual soldier -- will have changed significantly. The decade of the 1990s and beyond will introduce an era when low-intensity conflict (defined later) is the norm.*

WORLD CONTEXT TO THE YEAR 2000

Our projection of the world political-military context to the year 2000 is based on four fundamental assumptions:

Assumptions

- o General nuclear war will not occur by design.
- o A catastrophic breakdown of the world economic order will not occur.

*Robert H. Kupperman & Associates, Inc. (KAI) has had oral permission from all organizations concerned (Georgetown University CSIS, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the U.S. Army) to use the analytical conclusions of the two previous studies, which are in the public domain, as the starting point for this study. Thus, our approach to LIC is founded on the type of world forecasted by those two studies.

- o The Soviet Union will continue to pursue its goal of world domination and will remain the major adversary.
- o No unilateral technological breakthrough will occur that would grant any single nation total military dominance.

It is clear that major national security decisions in the United States may create discontinuities (major intervening variables) which could change the forecast.

Worldwide Trends

Political-military violence will continue with high frequency through the 1980s and 1990s. Most of this violence will take the form of low-intensity conflict: coercive diplomacy, special intelligence operations, psychological operations, terrorism and counterterrorism, various levels of guerrilla warfare, and Soviet proxy limited conventional war. Although many of the complex regional and functional sources of conflict will stem from North-South relationships, some of these conflicts will be played out in the context of the East-West struggle as surrogate mechanisms for direct East-West military confrontation. The reasons for this are fourfold:

1. The Soviets will gain and maintain a solid reputation for strategic nuclear parity, if not actual superiority. Soviet leaders, themselves, will believe that they have achieved such superiority. This will not lead, however, to Soviet first-use of strategic nuclear weapons for fear of incurring "unacceptable damage" from U.S. retaliatory strikes (whether

counterforce or countervalue) with slowly improving nuclear strategic offensive and defensive systems.*

Nor will this preclude Soviet willingness to negotiate arms reductions either for psyops objectives or to serve other Soviet vital interests. This sense of strategic superiority, however, will accelerate Soviet political-military adventures viewed by the Soviet leadership as relatively low cost and low risk operations with high geostrategic payoffs (especially in littorals along the SLOCs of the western industrial democracies) contributing to an increasingly favorable "correlation of forces."

2. Soviet detente with Western Europe will yield political and economic payoffs viewed as favorable by the Soviets. Soviet leaders will not be predisposed toward conventional war in Europe; the high risks of nuclear escalation would outweigh any possible benefits and, given progress by alternative means, would be unnecessary.
3. The Third World will be an increasingly attractive target for Soviet political-military initiatives in the 1980s. There will be skyrocketing population pressures, especially in urban areas, and food, water, and wood shortages. Cross-border refugee flows will create severe political problems. Competition by the industrialized nations for increasingly scarce energy and mineral resources will continue to drive

*Implicit in this argument is the Soviet perception that the U.S. response to Soviet first use of nuclear weapons would be automatic.

up prices and the costs of development capital; these shortages may foster conditions of intra- and interstate violence that the Soviet Union will seek to exploit.

4. If the United States does not make (in the mid-1980s) decisions on doctrine, equipment, organization, and training appropriate for LIC, the nation will be left with conventional military forces that, although formidable, the Soviets will view as inadequate to counter their various options in the Third World.

Although the causes and symptoms of some of the low-intensity violence in the 1980s and 90s may be treated by a variety of U.S. foreign policies, the United States must be able to consider military operations at all levels -- before and following crises. Given scarce U.S. resources for low-intensity operations at present, such capability must be linked to a strategy that envisions the use (or nonuse) of force in particular places under specific circumstances. The days of large "general purpose" military forces are passing; the concept of general purpose forces should be reevaluated as we look to the more likely future military conflicts.

Regional Trends

The following regional forecasts are based on extensive regional studies which conform to the Army Long-Range Planning System:

Western Europe. U.S.-Western European relations will have undergone a generic change by the 1990s. The combination of strong West European disappointment in U.S. alliance leadership, stark awareness of the preeminence of Soviet military power in the European region, attraction to trade with the U.S.S.R., resentment about U.S. pressures for greater European conventional defense contributions, and strong European domestic pressures for neutralist foreign policies will erode the essential spirit, if not the form, of the NATO alliance. These attitudes will be encouraged and exploited by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, and by the systematic penetration of detente movements. An apt expression to describe the political-military dimensions of these changes is "The Swedenization of Europe," a trend toward armed neutrality with significant implications for European defense strategies and weapons systems:

- o Switch to strategies of "territorial defense."
- o Smaller, less-costly, standing forces, relying on rapidly-mobilizable reserves.
- o Switch from expensive, high-tech, long-range weapons systems to less-expensive, high-tech, shorter range systems.

The Americas. In the Americas, Soviet activities primarily via Cuba and Cuban-supported proxy forces, will constitute a growing threat to U.S vital interests. The most likely arenas of low-to-medium intensity conflict up to the year 2000 are in Central America, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and possibly Puerto Rico. Escalation of this conflict beyond the conventional level is possible.

Africa. Africa will be affected by Soviet attempts to improve its global status as a superpower and to create a worldwide socialist community through low-cost, low-risk operations relying principally on psywar, proxy military forces, support for terrorist groups and military assistance to liberation movements. The Soviet Navy will continue to demonstrate Soviet commitment. However, the level of Soviet effort in Africa probably will be reduced as a result of increasing Soviet economic problems. It is unlikely that there will be an introduction of Soviet ground or air forces in the area.

East Asia and the Pacific. The most likely future for East Asia and the Western Pacific basin is a period of relative political calm and economic progress in the region. There may be minor outbreaks of violence both within and between some of the states, ranging from guerrilla-inspired unrest in South Korea and some ASEAN countries to sporadic, low-intensity violence on the Sino-Soviet, and Sino-Vietnamese and Thai-Vietnamese borders. The growing relative military strength of South Korea, the substantial increase in Japanese military capabilities, the relatively stable U.S.-Chinese relations and enhanced Chinese military capabilities, and the strengthened economies among ASEAN states will yield, by the latter 1990s, an uneasy but stable regional balance (assuming that North Korea remains deterred from attacking South Korea). In this regional environment, the Soviets likely will turn strategic attention to softer targets in other areas, opportunistically choosing those targets which afford them the highest payoff with minimal risk and cost.

Middle East/Southwest Asia. The Middle East/Southwest Asia is the most heterogenous and volatile of all. The most likely futures for the 1990s involve internal regional tension as well as external Soviet intervention. Continued terrorism, local friction between Saudi Arabia and the military powers surrounding it, and a high level of political-military tension will characterize regional relationships. The Soviet Union may attempt to increase its presence in the Gulf by a grab for Iran's Azerbaijan province, or in the Indian Ocean by means of a "Baluchi salient" out of Afghanistan. Either of these scenarios constitutes a significant threat to U.S. interests in the region, the former creating exploitable loci for Soviet-sponsored terrorism.

U.S. Mood and Low-Intensity Conflict

In the absence of any clear and present danger which unifies America, the U.S. "mood" will not pass out of the withdrawal ("isolationist") phase which began in 1970 until at least the latter 1980s. Successive budget cuts, already begun in the FY83 defense program, will mount as the thin veneer of the apparent 1980-81 defense consensus comes unglued. The American public will not be predisposed to support any forms of low-intensity operations which appear to be "foreign interventions", especially those tainted with the label "covert operations." Overt or covert rescue operations intended to end hostage seizures would be the exception.

Only at the end of the 1980s are the American Congress and public likely to realize fully the significance for U.S. national security interests of the slow but steady Soviet geostrategic

gains during the decade. Then, America will turn to a period of "interventionism," supported by a public willingness to sacrifice for defense, to preserve aggressively U.S. vital interests abroad -- only to find that the decisions not taken in the early-to-mid 1980s on Army doctrine and, more especially, weapons systems will constrain mission capabilities. By then it may be too late to reconfigure the Army's organization and training, or tailor the needed technology for a non-NATO environment.

Given the unlikelihood of a return to conscription by the latter 1990s, the impact of a gradually improving economy, and the shrinking manpower pool, the services will find the AVF in conditions reminiscent of the late 1970s -- low literacy levels, resurgent minority membership, poor morale and low readiness levels.

THE LOW-INTENSITY THREAT

The intent of this study is to address and illuminate some of the problems that the U.S. Army appears most likely to be facing over the next two decades. As discussed above, projections of the future political and military environment suggest that the least likely conflict in which the U.S. Army will participate is the high-intensity conventional Airland Battle in Europe in response to a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO -- because of the virtual assurance of early escalation to strategic nuclear war by the losing side.

KAI's position denies the now traditional assertion that the Army must be prepared first and foremost to meet "the most important threat" in Europe. The most important threat will be at the lower end of the conflict spectrum where Soviet operations are aimed directly at the internal security of American democracy and at "soft" geostrategic objectives astride the major SLOCs. The movement of resources are clearly vital to the security of the western industrial democracies, Japan, and other Asian nations where threats to U.S. interests will become more vital than current threats in Western Europe. This does not mean that the Army needs to seek new missions; rather, the dramatic changes in the geopolitical balance -- arenas and types of conflict -- foreseen over the next decades will result in dramatic changes in the likely missions the Army must meet. The action will be at the margins; the great powers, face-to-face, in a continuing confrontation, will have to develop a more panoramic view of their own interests as the transactions of the Third World become

increasingly significant. The next twenty years will be a period of small conflicts -- wars of oppression or liberation, wars fueled from within or as proxies of larger powers, conflicts below the level of war but with the power to topple nations or cripple governments.

In many of these geographic areas and political divisions, the U.S. will find its interests directly involved: the Monroe Doctrine will lead to certain U.S. positions in opposition to outside powers in the Americas; petroleum and politics will continue to engage the U.S. in the Americas; the Near East already threatens to become a semi-permanent operational theater for the U.S.; Africa and the Far East are important to the U.S. as trading partners and political independents. The future does not offer the prospect of less conflict than the past; in fact, the political entropy we face suggests an increasing breakdown of the established order and thus more, smaller conflicts. It is in these, at the low end of the conflict spectrum, that the U.S. opportunities and interests will be involved.

Unconventional Environments

There is general acceptance that "unconventional" wars are, indeed, unconventional -- they do not abide by the rules, the conventions. One might think that such conflict takes place beyond doctrine; in point of fact, this is hardly the case. Unconventional wars in the accepted sense, regular troops opposed to irregular guerrillas or terrorists, have been as carefully studied as any -- at least, on the defense. Such analysis,

furthermore, has produced a considerable international body of "doctrine" founded on experience in the field.

All unconventional wars are different although some are more different than others. What such conflicts share has not been of great use to those who must fight them; yet, every effort has been made to fashion models of what should result if certain strategies are followed. Special attention has been given, on the one hand, to intensity, levels of violence, stages of escalation or diminution and, on the other hand, to the implications of non-quantitative factors. Some count bodies and others weigh the spirit; the former is not always the main concern of the conventional warrior nor the latter of the rebel.

There are, however, fundamental aspects of such conflict which must be pondered in shaping missions, organization and training:

- o It is difficult to measure who is winning or losing. Most often, there will be no movement of battle lines. A body count, if accurate, may tell little about the bodies or the impact of their loss on the rebels, just as the casualties of the conventional may not be relevant to the ultimate outcome. One can count the number of weapons lost or found, the number of bombs or leaflets dropped, the hours of propaganda broadcasts, even the votes in a mid-campaign election, but the results seldom add up to a very clear picture.
- o The perceptions of those involved in fighting about who is winning or losing are important.
- o The rebel almost always escalates with a goal of destabilizing; the conventional warrior almost always seeks to restore a status quo ante.
- o Inhospitable terrain almost always favors the rebel.
- o In conflicts fought without external aid or involvement, the level of domestic intelligence is much higher. Conventional forces especially need to discover what the people in the area of operations really think, what their perceptions are, what they

will tolerate. Without the toleration of the population, UW operations are difficult if not impossible.

- o Low-intensity war is more often than not a psychological contest of will waged by military means. It truly is about the hearts and minds of people. Generals, thus, are often forbidden to take military steps that seem wise for battle purposes -- to escalate or to use counterterror or to enlarge the arena. They are often denied resources that -- for battle purposes -- seem vital. They are asked to take risks that seem militarily unwise. To the contrary, rebel leaders may launch attacks with what seems criminal optimism or persist beyond the point of reason.
- o There is an asymmetrical division of assets on the contending sides, the most patent being that the conventional army is visible while the unconventional force is nowhere to be found.
- o The levels of technical sophistication almost always favor the regular over the irregular (jet-delivered smart bombs against rifles). Yet, the deployment of hi-tech weaponry, whether enhancing mobility or intelligence or battlefield communications, may, because of other factors, be of limited value.
- o No matter how many special forces are deployed or special missions undertaken, the conventional army is an army and is so organized. When revolutionary armies are fashioned as armies (China), they by necessity act like armies and fight conventionally. Irregulars, however, may be organized as a party or in military cells or in tiny terrorist action groups attached to an overt party, or as hidden militia, or without full-time members -- or in any number of non-conventional ways.
- o The level of political commitment is almost always higher on the irregular, rebel side. They fight for the future, not to protect the present arrangements. Largely, they volunteer for political reasons, not to make a career. Conventional soldiers may have superb morale but little interest in "the issues" while the irregular without prospect of pension or promotion, without uniform or awards, risks his life not for an institution or a friend or distant national interest but for a cause.
- o Oddly enough, both sides are likely to overestimate both their own assets and those of their opponents.

Terrorism in Low-Intensity Conflict

These aspects of unconventional warfare are not a new dimension in the kinetics of international rivalry. What is new is an international climate which appears to offer a strategic rationale for unconventional warfare, including new forms of terrorism.

Hardly a day passes without a terrorist incident occurring somewhere in the world. Although the United States has not so far been a primary target of attack, any optimism that this benign state of affairs will continue is misplaced. Used as a strategic weapon, the vectored terrorist threat offers certain unique advantages in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Although unimpressive in firepower, it is profound in leverage. Too, the initial uncertainty about the origin of attack often limits the full range of diplomatic and military response. For the Soviet Union and its proxies -- and certain of the radical national and subnational groups on the terrorist scene -- terrorism may offer an irresistibly low-cost, low-risk means of engaging the West in low-intensity conflict.

The significance of the terror act has been raised exponentially by several different but interrelated factors. First, the tools available for destruction are suddenly much more lethal and much more frightening than ever before. Second, the media attention focused on terrorism is immediate, global and usually undisciplined. Third, motives for terrorist attack today span a spectrum that includes, at the extremes, personal grudges and superpower ambitions of global hegemony -- and there is little certainty as to which underlying motive may really be at

play in any particular case. Finally, this nation (unlike others in the Western Alliance has no internal consensus on how to respond to either acts of supercriminal violence or coercive political threats; has no common philosophical basis for accepting the high costs (in lives, materials, pride and power) of occasional failure in dealing with terrorism; and has no internationally recognized commitment to firm, retributive deterrence of such violence.

Neither the civil nor military authorities can remain aloof from the terror threat. The 1979 seizure of the American embassy in Teheran demonstrated not only that the U.S. is a visible target but a vulnerable one as well. In that instance, none of our conventional policy tools achieved success. Diplomacy, economic sanctions, international condemnation, and the prestige of America failed to move the Iranians. The final embarrassment -- and eventually the loss of the Presidency for Jimmy Carter -- took place in the Iranian desert. All that was left was a "rug bazaar," negotiating the price to release the hostages. Though in fact an unfair perception, our military appeared impotent, capable only of inflicting nuclear carnage.

The more recent attack on the American embassy in Lebanon represents a new form of "cushion shot" terrorism. That attack was more than a violent expression of anti-Americanism; it was an attempt to influence, through the media, the outcome of the delicate Middle Eastern negotiations and America's attempt to fill the role of "honest broker" in those negotiations. The assassination attempt on General Kroesen in Germany and

kidnapping of General Dozier in Italy were similarly leveraged attacks. These incidents made clear that NATO -- particularly the strains within the alliance -- are exploitable terrorists targets.

While amateurs may continue to rely on the time-tested tactics of terrorism, like skyjacking, the imaginative, professional terrorist has a number of avenues available for future attack:

- attacks on the infrastructure of metropolitan areas (electric or gas networks, communications, or computer facilities) with a level of disruption beyond the capabilities of the local police or National Guard;
- threats to thousands of people with agents of mass destruction such as nuclear explosives, chemical, biological or radiological weapons;
- subtle exploitation of contentious political issues such as the anti-nuclear and environmental movements .

The days in which terrorism was confined to isolated instances of social disruption may well be over. Contemporary terrorism has become a tactic of strategic value whether employed by neo-nihilistic subnational groups or by nation states. It is a breed of low-intensity conflict, with large scale conventional or nuclear warfare the likely consequence of failing to cope at the molecular level of violence.


DEFINITIONS

It seems useful first to probe the possible definitional variations of the term, "low-intensity conflict". The current Army definitions are inherently prestrained by having to fit within the policy envelope of "Internal Defense and Development" (IDAD) foreign assistance operations. This constraint, then, yields the following kind of definition:

Internal defense and development assistance operations involving U.S. advice, combat support, and combat service support for indigenous or allied forces, or actions by U.S. combat forces to establish, regain, or maintain control of specific land areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution, subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power.

This definition does not seem broad enough today to encompass the probable devolution of the next twenty years. It appears that we face an increasingly disordered world that poses an increasingly sharp dilemma for the U.S. Army: the least likely conflicts -- escalated Airland Battle in Europe or large RDJTF deployment in the Persian Gulf -- are driving the resource allocations, while the more likely kinds of conflict -- limited and unconventional low-intensity activities -- are receiving a level of national attention far lower than warranted by both the threats and the opportunities. A first step toward appropriate recognition can be a lateral and vertical expansion of the Army's working definition of "low-intensity conflict".

In this reexamination, we can consider a horizontal axis as representing conflict itself, starting with utopian peace and moving across the spectrum of passive and active discontent toward increasingly organized forms of violence abutting the rather arbitrary boundaries of mid and high-intensity conflict (conventional and all-out war). Separately, we can consider the range of utility of each of the many instrumentalities available to act within the conflict envelope. These instrumentalities include normal diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, psychological operations, various formal and informal sanctions, military assistance, special intelligence operations, terrorism and counterterrorism operations, surgical strikes, guerrilla warfare, transborder raids and incursions, insurgency, revolution, and up to the limited use of regular armed forces, potentially under conditions of organized armed opposition.



The applicability of any instrumentality is heavily dependent upon the individual situation: in a particular case, U.S. interests might best be served through intensive psychological operations that create and maintain a level of social and economic disorder sufficient to prevent the coalescence of those attitudes and organizations that would otherwise lead to violence. In another case, encouragement ab initio of civil disobedience coupled with violent special operations strikes at the infrastructure of an area may be the best means of achieving a U.S. policy objective. The U.S. Army is not, of course, always going to be the chosen action element for every possible exercise of power. The imposition of economic sanctions, the practice of diplomacy, or the maintenance of a naval blockade, are hardly Army missions. However, the Army will be the instrument of choice in the majority of likely cases simply because it has at least the cadre upon which to build the necessary capabilities that U.S. policy execution requires. And, at the core of those capabilities are the unique military elements of the Special Forces, Ranger, Civil Affairs, and psychological warfare units.

The most outstanding characteristic of low-intensity conflict in the past and today seems to be fundamental asymmetry between the parties engaged -- asymmetry of objectives, of forces, and particularly of leverage, with the advantage usually belonging to the offense. It must be immediately noted that "offense" here need not require violent military-type engagements and confrontations. There are equally valid but more subtle

pressures that are routinely applied to oppositions in pursuit of political purposes. These pressures range from psychological warfare to industrial sabotage. Offense can quickly reach the stage of organized, purposeful violence -- structured as terror, terrorism, insurgency, or revolt.

Beyond what may be termed "legitimate" organizational instrumentalities for either the creation or suppression of these, there remain the political objectives -- holding or gaining authority within a geographically or ethnically constrained society being the most common today. A century ago, the Army's enemy was the Great Plains' Indians, and the Indians' objectives were to regain independence, protect traditionalism, and insulate themselves from the irruptions of Caucasians. In the Philippines a few years later, Aguinaldo's rebels sought instant independence; in the Caribbean, soldiers and Marines policed territories in support of U.S. policies of economic stability. On Mexico's northern border, the U.S. responded militarily in 1916 to what can be seen today as unimportant incursions spawned by unrequited social unrest reaching back to the "grito" of 1810 (the cry for independence). It is also useful to include consideration of French problems in Lebanon, Madagascar and Algeria after World War II; to recall the process of Dutch, French, and British decolonialization in the Far East; and to bring up the seemingly endless political and military revolving doors in Africa, the Near East, and the Middle East as post-war realignments of authority occurred.

In any or all of these kinds of conflicts, recast in current or future idioms, basic U.S. interests are likely to be at stake.

The Army, the basic U.S. instrumentality for the projection of force with a realistic graduation of lethality (clubs to cannons) -- proportionality of response -- should be ready to comprehend this wider scope and more challenging future environment. History has shown the U.S. policy structure -- and thus the U.S. military's -- to be essentially reactive, an echo of the prerevolutionary "Don't Tread on Me" political sentiments. Adapting to the times, it seems necessary to enlarge the military intellectual horizon to encompass direct initiatives, actions at the margins of the political spectrum formerly reserved only to clandestine programs, and modern versions of the self-sustaining columns of the past -- whether for exploration and conquest, whether punitive or relief (with echoes of Alexander, Vikings, Cossack migrations, the Northwest Frontier, Mafeking, Peking and the rest). Beyond these, we must recognize the ugliest of all tasks that has, periodically, fallen to the U.S. Army: the formal exercise of national police powers at the order of the President within U.S. territory and in opposition to U.S. citizens with contentious objections (strong views that conflict with local and national government). This is the sort of situation beyond the reach of the State Capitol and its National Guard resources; beyond normal police responsibilities and yet short of civil war; beyond the historical limits of intersocietal enmity and still within that society.

What then should be the Army's working definition of "low-intensity conflict"? It seems patent that the narrower approach of the past, tied as it has been to the basic philosophy that the

U.S. soldier operates outside the U.S. at the invitation of legitimate host governments, should be broadened, if only gingerly, to encompass more of the hostility spectrum. As a working definition, the following is suggested:

Low-intensity warfare is the military recourse of nations and organizations to limited force or the threat of force to achieve political objectives without the full-scale commitment of resources and will that characterizes nation-state wars of survival or conquest. Typically, low-intensity conflict involves relatively small numbers of participants from all sides in relation to the importance of the political objectives at stake; these are always highly leveraged, usually asymmetrical, forms of political action. Low-intensity conflict and (whether conducted by the U.S. or by others) can include coercive diplomacy, police functions, psychological operations, insurgency; guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and military/paramilitary deployments with limited goals. While the intensity may be low the duration may be very long. Because unconventional tactics are often used, success in low-intensity conflict is seldom that of conventional victory by force of arms; success often is measured only by avoidance of certain outcomes or by attitudinal changes in a target group. Low-intensity operations are not confined to overseas but may be necessary within the U.S. in response to civil disorder or terrorism. The U.S. Army engages in low-intensity conflict as a major mission in support of U.S. global interests and with the support of the U.S. population.

For the purposes of this working definition, the terms low intensity conflict and unconventional warfare can be used interchangeably. However, unconventional tactics can be used at any intensity of conflict. Thus, for example, an OSS was used successfully behind enemy lines -- that office having clandestinely employed sabotage and terrorist tactics against the Nazis. Today, unconventional, highly erosive tactics are employed by terrorist groups in order to destabilize western democracies.

THE ARMY'S LIC ROLES

The fact that the Army must prepare for the European war it is unlikely to fight -- and thus be unable to commit limited resources to the more likely arenas of conflict -- poses a serious dilemma for the nation. At the policy level, it is difficult to tell our allies that the Army is shifting emphasis to forces that are better geared to meeting U.S. -- not NATO -- policy objectives. (Nevertheless, the ability to deal with non-European conflicts should be considered an extension of the NATO role, and some congruence of objectives sought.) It is even harder to accomplish that shift without making it evident to NATO that resources are being diverted unilaterally. There are likely to be pressures both in Europe and America against U.S. troop withdrawals. And yet, if the premises of this study are sound, that diversion is exactly what the Army must accomplish if it is to shape a force trained and equipped for low-intensity conflict.

The possible (or even probable) demands on the Army are, by the nature of the conflict assumed, quite varied. The Army is

today prepared for one class of LIC (the IDAD case) in a friendly country such as El Salvador. It is less prepared for LIC in a proactive, or offensive phase. This might include a Cuban or Nicaraguan situation with an essentially hostile population to convert or avoid or military operations against an outside enemy in essentially neutral or uninvolved land -- such as confronting Cuban troops in parts of equatorial Africa not involved in internal ideological dissensions. The third case would involve the federal exercise of police powers within the United States.

Army forces need to have a new kind of resupply independence -- these unconventional conflicts may place high values on unconventional logistics. It is likely that self-sufficient light infantry operations without sea or air logistic support will be an important capability for the exercise of U.S. policy options. It is certain that role-reversal, i.e., U.S. troops able to serve in an aggressive role without conflict escalation, is to be sought. It is also likely that U.S. troops will be committed in tactical environments quite different than heretofore included in doctrine; for example, proliferation of greatly advanced, light "fire-and-forget" anti-aircraft weapons will make some skies aircraft-free both for the U.S. and its opposition.

It seems equally clear that the U.S. objectives to which military forces contribute will evolve and change with the passage of time -- and with greater flexibility of action provided by an improved and rebalanced U.S. force structure. It will be important to demonstrate that U.S. forces can be

committed to foreign policy objectives without the inherent probability of escalation. It will be important to the exercise of foreign policy to have a serious capability for force already in hand without facing the hurdle of partisan domestic demurrers. Clearly, the risking of the lives of U.S. military personnel, under either reactive or proactive conditions, will always have to involve the Congress as well as the Executive. However, when the forces available are clearly tailored to deescalate military commitments, their employment will be less likely to be barred. Further, availability of appropriate troops demonstrably able to bring to bear exactly the appropriate amount of force will permit more overt U.S. action and less dependence on covert tactics.

Tailoring forces in this fashion requires one significant change in prevailing military attitudes: the U.S. must move away from its binary perception of the world. Military thinking has always been uneasy with uncertainties, especially in the definition of the opposition. There is today too great a tendency to cast the origin of any political or military force in contest with U.S. objectives into the Soviet camp, either directly or by association. This tendency overly narrows the scope of U.S. thinking and therefore the range of U.S. options perceived as open in a case of conflict. The potential opponents of the U.S., operating at the margins of the NATO-Warsaw Pact spheres of military influence, include many subnational organizations with nationalist or independence goals -- which may conflict with U.S. aims in the area. These potential opponents include many self-declared Marxist revolutionary groups and governments that have virtually no intellectual or political

relationship with Soviet communism, but that have simply used slogans and popular appeal to bring themselves to power. In fact, a four d' horizon of the non-bloc nations in which the U.S. may find itself carrying out military operations in the next twenty years or so -- given the appropriate forces -- suggests there are few reliable Soviet proxies and few Soviet-dominated countries among them, while there are quite a few that are not aligned with the U.S. or the West in general. It will take a great deal of sensitivity to create a military organization that responds to U.S. interests without responding to the emotional overtones involved in the concept of "enemy." After all, in the shifting panorama of the 1990s, it is likely that today's revolutionary opponent will be tomorrow's legitimate ruler and friend -- and vice versa. The U.S. at large -- and particularly the active new Army -- must move toward the old British formulation of "interests, not allies".

Scenarios

To highlight the problems of the future Army in more specific terms, three brief LIC scenarios are offered, not necessarily as the most likely but as the most exemplary:

a. A U.S. City in Revolt. A combination of poor, and minority activist elements succeeds, to its own surprise, in achieving significant political success throughout the Southwest but centered in the Los Angeles area. The new factors here are the socio-political refusal of the dissenting elements to operate within the larger U.S. political and legal framework, a source of advanced arms (RPG-7, SAM-7 and better) from abroad and the

uncertainty of police or National Guard loyalty because of strong local ties and affinities. A crisis triggered by incidents and demands leads to White House decisions to fall back upon regular Army units to restore order, disarm dissidents, and close all border traffic (land, sea and air) -- all without bloodshed if possible, and all with a careful eye on the political impact every action will have on the rest of the country through the print and electronic media.

b. A Caribbean Intervention. In a sense, American intervention in Central America and the Caribbean by one means or another has become traditional in this century. Actions have ranged from sponsored coups through proxy invasions to expeditionary forces fighting a guerrilla war. There is no reason to assume that future situations demanding this type of response will disappear.

A government under stress with violent civil dissent from the Left apparently fueled by Cuba might call on American aid with various rationales. This aid might be needed immediately. A situation could evolve with American troops on the ground wherein the host government dissolves and Cuban "volunteers" appear. All the potential problems in low-intensity tasking would be present in one degree or another, but the most pressing would be:

- o The logistics of getting something more than a token force on the ground immediately without an assurance of a host welcome or Cuban quiescence.
- o The great uncertainty about the local political scene or the personalities involved.
- o The Cuban force of uncertain size, but perhaps of considerable technical competence. Cuba might escalate. The Army would have to consider means of per-

suasion directed at Havana (without escalating the combat) to reduce the Cuban commitment.

- o The operations on the ground, perhaps without host support or local legitimacy, potentially in face of local opposition, and an easily resupplied Cuban expeditionary force with sophisticated weapons.

c. A covert African campaign. Africa has remained an arena for East-West competition in various modes including proxy guerrilla warfare, purchased coups, military aid, third-power military intervention, and various diplomatic initiatives. America has no African imperial past but has acquired African friends. Alliances and alignments, have been shifting -- Somalia has moved from the Soviet sphere to the American and would probably move elsewhere to achieve its national interests. Some of our friends, new or old, want a warm but distant relationship; others want a visible sign of Washington's interest. In certain cases, a military commitment might be necessary.

The leader of a friendly African country might formally request American aide in cleansing his border provinces of intruders he claims are paid, proxy agents of Moscow and not separatists. He feels, however, that an overt American involvement in the country would endanger sovereignty so that he wants a relatively substantial training and advisory force moved in and maintained covertly. Once again, all the general problems exist, especially:

- o how to get such a force into the country, deploy it, and maintain it all secretly, especially from the Western Press (relying upon the CIA has proven disastrous in the past.)
- o how to organize with severe logistic and communication problems an anti-insurgency campaign with what may be only minimal aid from the host country.

- o how to operate in a very alien atmosphere.
- o how to respond if the so-called "proxy agents" turn out to be just that with sophisticated weapons and part of a larger commitment.

d. Middle East. Because of the most basic strategic concerns, American involvement in the Middle East has been a fact since the end of World War II. That involvement has ranged from sponsored coups to political, economic and military aid, and to American military presence. It is an arena where global, regional, local, as well as political, economic, social and religious issues evolve constantly. Furthermore, the countries in the area are fractionated with regard to East-West or North-South conflicts. Any conflict in the region (whether within a country or between countries) can escalate rapidly to threaten U.S. regional and global interests, and may require immediate American intervention.

The leader(s) of a friendly Middle East country request American economic, and weapons aid -- and conceivably direct military help because:

- o the country is threatened or attacked by a neighboring country fueled or backed directly by the Soviet Union or its proxies.
- o riots, terrorism and guerrilla warfare are launched by indigenous forces, supported or operating together with Soviet-backed military forces. (The Syrian involvement in Lebanon is an example.)
- o the country is in the midst of a civil war among minority groups, complicated by a foreign (political or religious) force.
- o a military coup is intended to shift the country to the Soviet sphere of influence.
- o tensions, if not outright coup attempts, ultimately threaten the oil fields of the Persian Gulf States.

Other scenarios might include:

- o Domestic dissent beyond the affected nation's capacity to cope successfully and so serious as to require military intervention.
- o A major rescue and evacuation effort in a hostile arena.
- o Overt or clandestine economic and military aid and supply to a pro-American country involved in a war.
- o Reprisals and punishment mission.

All of the potential problems connected with low-intensity tasking would be present in one degree or another in any region; nevertheless, there are a number of risks and problems peculiar to the Middle East:

- o Any accident or conflict in the Middle East can escalate in a short time into an all out war leading to military confrontation between the superpowers.
- o In any direct military intervention by the U.S., our forces could be confronted with sophisticated Eastern weapon systems.
- o The results of such intervention, if negative, may adversely affect the U.S. position of influence in the region and beyond.
- o There is a lack of reliable infrastructure for logistics.
- o Much of the military activity may occur in very highly populated areas.
- o Conflicting interests between pro-western countries in the region may create additional instabilities.

e. Commonalities. Although each low-intensity warfare task facing the United States Army will be different, nearly all will share a variety of conditions that in all likelihood will present similar problems. No matter what the future scenario, no matter where or how significant, there will be commonalities with all

others. And, these commonalities will present the Army with certain problems:

- o overriding political concerns in Washington will determine the nature of the military commitment. This means that whether the Army is charged with showing the flag, putting down domestic dissent, or putting the maximum number of troops in a distant place in minimum time, the Administration will be mainly concerned with non-military matters. The battle Washington seeks to win is political and media oriented rather than military in nature, so first things first.
- o There will be a haste to respond to real or even potential situations for both political and military reasons that will leave little time for adequate, prior planning. The assumption will be, often correctly, that it will be better to do anything now than the proper thing later.
- o Almost surely, certainly at first, there will be, uncertain intelligence concerning the arena of conflict. Some in fact may know a great deal but it is unlikely that the Army will know immediately who these people are, and in some cases, no one may actually know what is going on.
- o Potentially there will be inappropriate military resources to deal with the problem since the problem may lie outside standard Army tasking or must be solved with what is available instantly. Even in a long-drawn out unconventional conflict, the Army may be ill-suited for the challenge (peacekeeping, riot control, or anti-terrorism).
- o The logistic difficulties of extending power (even at times within the continental United States) will complicate any unconventional task.
- o Once a force is in place, there will be an even greater difficulty in maintaining a military presence at a distance. It is pointless, no matter the urgency, to put a unit on the ground without being able to resupply it.
- o For most troops there will be problems of operating in an alien atmosphere -- an unknown geography, different people, customs, and language. Everything from the water to the weather will be strange -- and this, to a real degree, would be equally true if the Army were deployed to contain a riot in a major American city.
- o There may be an uncertain welcome by a host with mixed feelings about an American presence -- and the original

host may be replaced during the course of the crisis by one even less enthusiastic.

- o There will be the impact of indigenous personal and political factors. This may take the form of simple personality clashes with the local leadership, but might include complex disagreements over political priorities. The host may well want different results from the American presence than does Washington.
- o The on-the-ground opponents may have hidden assets that could range from fire-and-forget weapons to powerful friends in the United Nations, or even the ability to manipulate the seven o'clock television news in the United States.
- o Once on the ground, the Army will have to pursue with vigor assets difficult to acquire through standard operating procedures: for example, disinterested intelligence, doctrinal flexibility in the field, and expanded psywar capacity. In an unconventional situation, the Army must become unconventional to some extent and this is, in itself, an irregular, difficult task.
- o There may be shifting political priorities on the ground and in Washington based on perceptins of reality. The original task may slip into another or be completely rearranged regardless of the military situation. Irregular wars tend to slip and slide with imprecision. We need only remind ourselves of the historical unfolding of Vietnam -- its etiology from the limited use of advisers and covert operations to full scale political and military disaster.

THE PROBLEMS OF RESPONSE

Given that the above short scenarios outline some of the edges of the future areas of Army LIC action, what are the Army's problems in being able to respond to the challenges these pose? The real questions here fall into three categories: organization, doctrine, and tactics; manpower training and attitudes; and equipment and logistics. None of the three is separate, and retaining cohesion among all aspects of the "LIC Army" may, in itself, become a future problem.

a. Doctrine, Organization, and Tactics. If the Army, as a political instrument of the government is expected to be able to manage low-intensity conventional conflicts in reactive and proactive modes at home and abroad, the proportion of the Army available for these tasks must increase significantly, an increase large enough to warrant consideration of a new organization that would subsume the present Special Forces, Ranger, Civil Affairs, and psyops units.

From the doctrinal viewpoint, this approach complicates many things, since one would expect to see elements of other combat and support branches within certain Army contingents assigned to unconventional tasks, depending on the mission. Thus, what seems needed is a new concept of mobile light infantry with integral armor and artillery assigned as needed. For most LIC missions, that armor and artillery must be much lighter than present systems. In this case, doctrine for deployment and action would recognize the two major cases in addition to the current basic IDAD doctrine -- the proactive use of appropriate

force anywhere in the world and the ultimate police authority within the U.S. This suggests separate doctrine development for all three, each recognizing the major common points made earlier -- operations will be in less than ideal conditions with objectives not fully developed and even politically and militarily contradictory.

Doctrine for proactive exercises of force should, it seems, stress the probable austerity of logistics and, in a reversal of the Army's more conventional role, the need to be "successful" guerrillas. It will be important to establish new and very different measures of success in this role: for example, the Army may easily be asked to be simply a hidden threat tying down regular forces and occasionally destroying physical infrastructure. "Winning" such a war means not losing lives, not killing indigenous people, and only occasionally creating disturbances connected directly to the desired image of a guerrilla force that cannot be dislodged and that can operate at will in the countryside.

On the other hand, policy may dictate a significantly higher visibility for an Army contingent operating out of a given country. It is not beyond probability to consider light forces charged with the rapid removal or destruction of identified indigenous or proxy forces -- perhaps one of the Ethiopian groups, or the Angolan Cubans, or part of the Canadian irredentists. In such cases, objectives seem to be more conventional, though the means of achieving them remain less so.

Perhaps the most difficult lesson that a new organization will have to learn from recent events around the world, as well as from the dictates of common sense, is that command and control must be delegated to the lowest possible level. This really means assuring that squads and companies know the objectives, and can keep higher headquarters informed of their progress; it means at the same time that the higher echelons can be trusted not to interfere with the lower. "Command and control" will, in a new Army, reflect technical capabilities more than rigid structure or doctrine. It will also affect structure and doctrine because more senior NCOs and officers will be needed per capita.

In the case of the federal exercise of police powers within the U.S., Army doctrine must be developed along a dual path: meet force with unquestionably superior force in the case of criminal terrorism, but exercise ultimate force only as a last resort (to save life) in the case of contentious objectors who find outlet in civil disturbance, riot, and mass disobedience. The Army in a police role within the U.S. can win -- success is measured by return to civil self-government without casualties, either physical or psychological.

As the difference in doctrine for the three major categories of unconventional conflict develops, so will tactics. The less the objectives deal with winning in a military sense, the more the tactics employed will have to reflect, down to the level of the individual soldier, a mature understanding of the mission and the complexity of the particular societal/political/economic environment in which the Army is operating. While the basic capabilities of this new organization are those of mobile, light

infantry, the necessary overlay of essentially non-military tactics needed to assure success poses a difficult challenge for training commands. In one sense, every soldier needs to be worth a company; he also needs to be worth a small diplomatic mission. Small unit commanders will have political as well as military responsibilities.

b. Manpower, Training, and Attitudes. The curricula of the Army's professional military schools will require significant change to provide appropriate education on LIC. The current "Low-Intensity Warfare" manual, FM 100-20, covers IDAD -- only a part (albeit a significant part) of the LIC spectrum. An appropriate LIC program of instruction must include:

- o Soviet special intelligence operations (classified instruction).
- o Psyops
- o Terrorism and counterterrorism
- o IDAD
- o Soviet proxy operations

In more general terms there are four aspects of training that might be stressed:

- o Area Analysis. Front commanders of whatever rank or assignment should be exposed to the importance of arena intelligence in an unconventional conflict, both historical and potential. Obviously, relatively few commanders can be exposed first hand to potential combat arenas or undertake intensive schooling to that purpose, but considerable attention should be placed on the universal importance of the area. In some cases classes could draw general considerations from one potential arena (the Gulf or Central America), but the importance of stressing unconventional factors is crucial.
- o Language Training. Institute mandatory language training for all officers. There is virtually no other way to get sufficient language talent elsewhere.

Officers are college graduates, and should have the aptitude and professionalism to acquire and maintain language proficiency in at least one major language. Foreign Area Officers should concentrate on learning the more exotic languages for which immediate demand is not so great, and which require more time to learn.

- o Field Exercises should stress "non-military" factors in particular: (1) special arena conditions (an anti-guerrilla exercise in Georgia has real but circumscribed value) should be real (even a limited exposure of American troops to real Egyptian conditions is valuable); (2) interservice cooperation should be a constant consideration in planning field exercises -- and, if possible, non-military agencies or considerations should be factored into field problems; (3) again in all exercises, interagency intelligence analysis should be involved -- and "intelligence" of all sorts at all levels injected into the maneuver.
- o Simulations are enormously cost-effective and most useful. While they run the gamut of in-box-out-box exercises, through expensive computer games to very high-level affairs, the most immediate need would be those involving a high political input, interservice/interagency involvement at both strategic and tactical levels, and at times run in conjunction with field exercises.

The demands for all-around excellence of the individual soldier suggested above will come in the 1990s at the very time when availability of young, dedicated, educated, and motivated men will be dropping off. It is unlikely that the Congress, for partisan political reasons, will be willing to institute a full-scale draft. It is unhealthy to rely on an "economic draft" that skims the intelligent but temporarily unemployed, and it is unlikely that volunteers will provide the steady-state, long-term reenlistment source of supply needed for a large force of professional mobile light infantry and special operations forces. It will probably take something like six years to bring the selected recruit up to the desired standards of professionalism -- Ranger training, Special Forces specialities, language

proficiencies, and socio-political sensitivities. A minimum of another six years on duty will be required to extract value-for-value paid. This suggests a career ladder in the new combat organization that provides greater incentives for skills and wisdom than heretofore possible, and that is more closely tailored to fit the idiosyncracies of the individual than does today's Army. The new combat organization will, naturally enough, need a certain percentage of competent high-technology personnel; its backbone will be made up of older, experienced, and mature soldiers with more affinity to Britain's Falkland assault force than to the Atari (video arcade) generation.

One serious problem needs to be addressed, and that is the tendency of the Army elite and the U.S. population as a whole to grow quietly apart from each other until the Army is no longer representative of the society whose bidding it is intended to do. Praetorianism seems to be a natural social result of relying upon a professional military elite; praetorianism is socially extremely dangerous and must be avoided, not by suppressing entry and service requirements to the lowest common denominator but by raising them significantly above the median. Emphasis on understanding democratic values must become an important part of the professional selection criteria. The Special Forces today reflect almost all of the elements of individual intelligence, maturity, and commitment suggested here; the difficult question is whether that highly successful specialty can be expanded to a large, standing force of men in peace time (defined here as the absence of U.S. participation in a mid-or-high intensity conflict).

c. Equipment and Logistics. There has always been an American faith in technology to solve problems, even at times, human problems. There is no doubt that in most unconventional conflicts the United States Army will have an advantage in technological equipment -- and, effective communications or swift transportation may be more useful than advanced weaponry. While no one would want to trade in any such advantages, there are certain problems. Tackling "them" is rarely an Army task, but assuming that there exist hi-tech fixes for them would be foolish. Mostly hi-tech weaponry and equipment make unconventional wars easier to fight (no one would want to give them up) but hardly guarantee the outcome. In fact, not only are there limitations on hi-tech assets, such assets may in some cases, also prove to be liabilities.

- o Allied inexperience. It is difficult to train people on advanced weapons when they are scarcely used to primitive tools -- an M-16 may not seem "advanced" to Americans but in the field in inexperienced hands may not work as well as the old shotgun, and when experienced, American allies may for reasons of prestige use the new, hi-tech weapons to little advantage, giving up old effective tactics and techniques for the new fashion.
- o Impact on escalation. Especially in low intensity warfare, the injection of new technology may very well lead to escalation (batons to water hoses to plastic-bullets and riot control agents to real bullets). Since, in most cases, the Americans have been defending the center, escalation is highly undesirable. In such cases the more the war appears a war, and is perceived as such, the more endangered the center. Helicopter gunships in El Salvador may have distinct military advantages (assuming they can be deployed properly), but they also may have equally real disadvantages in those crucial non-military areas that usually determine the outcome of low-intensity wars.

- o Cost-effectiveness. In an low-intensity war, unconventional counter-measures in response to hi-tech challenges are usually amazingly cost-effective. The most elaborate and costly equipment can be frustrated by very little or evaded by only human effort. In this matter, at least, the "lessons" of Vietnam are obvious -- and obvious even when the cost to the enemy was not low but high.
- o Overdependence. An Army replete with hi-tech equipment with the most amazing capacities has understandably an inclination to depend on such equipment. The weapons are so good, so sophisticated, so deadly that they must be working. Yet, even if they were, which is not always the case, this still does not mean the war is being won.
- o Design. By and large, American weapons, except in a few cases, have not been designed for unconventional conflicts. Some regular weapons may adapt readily, but some, especially complex ones, may not, particularly in allied hands. Some weapons that may be useful are not regulation. There is no light tank, no armored car, no sub-machine gun -- mostly this is not crucial. Weapons can be acquired (hunting rifles for snipers, Uzis from Israel, shotguns for close work, especially armed jeeps, etc.). It is, however, an indication that the Army has been more prepared for UW in theory than in practice.

Everything noted above about low-intensity war at the margins of great power engagement, suggests that the LIC forces must have equipment and logistic lines just as tailored to their mission as is their doctrine and manpower. The basic definition used thus far -- mobile light infantry -- establishes one key set of criteria: equipment must be light, easily transportable and disguised or hidden, uncomplicated, and inexpensive -- the individual commander should be willing to abandon gear rather than become its hostage. There should be powerful emphasis on "fire-and-forget" weapons, remotely activated antivehicle explosives and smart munitions, whether for use against aircraft, helicopters, tanks, or APCs and trucks.

A new class of dedicated radio communications seems needed and easily achievable: secure multipath, probably satellite-based, radio links to and from the squad through battalion levels. These links should probably be designed as "burst" communications in order to avoid easy location with radio-detection gear and to make the systems useful in case of use in the larger mid-and-high-intensity conflicts. Here, of course means become crucial -- as many elements of the C3I system are dispersed and may individually fail.

Of great importance for the class of conflict envisaged here are sabotage explosives, mines and booby-traps. The Army today is lacking many of the assets available during earlier conflicts, and has had little focused R&D capability to address this family of requirements. Much larger on the overall scale is the question of specialized transport, especially "stealthy" penetration aircraft for initial deliveries of troop units and subsequent resupply flights. Interservice coordination and interoperability doctrines have denied the Army the dedicated aviation it would need in its LIC modes. For other reasons, largely economic and political trade offs, the Army has not been able to finance development and deployment of the very lightweight unconventional combat vehicles it would need for operations outside the U.S., nor has it been successful in moving to a whole new generation of light, caseless, small arms ammunition. This does not mean that all the above should definitely be pursued as capabilities; it does mean that all these and more should be potentially available without the deadly

constraints of European theater-inspired resource shortages and doctrinal barriers.

d. NBC Uses in LIC: A Special Case. Much of the debate about national defense and weapons development has focused upon nuclear matters -- from the proposed MX system to the Pershing II long-range theater weapon. We have considered active defenses as well, including the SAFEGUARD system of the early 70s and now, President Reagan's pleas for expanded research into an eventual reliance upon space-borne laser and particle beam ballistic missile defenses.

While the availability of "star wars" weapons is many years off, we face other means of attack from which new dangers will arise -- threats which cannot be countered by any ballistic missile defense. There will be "have" and "have-not" nations -- an emergent international regime in which the disenfranchised and the truly impoverished have the least to lose by employing weapons of mass destruction. As a result rogue nations, such as Libya, and terrorist subnational groups may rely increasingly upon NBC weapons to achieve their deterrent and warfighting goals. Of the three, biological weapons -- which leave few, if any, fingerprints -- are the most insidious.

Chemical agents, including nerve gases, such as VX and GB, could kill hundreds to possibly thousands of people. Radiological agents often produce delayed effects -- the horrifying prospects of a near certain cancer put off a decade or two. By contrast, biological agents can kill thousands, conceivably millions, within a week or two of the initial attacks.

In 1972, the Soviet Union and the U.S. signed the Biological Warfare Convention. The U.S. has lived up to its provisions meticulously. Yet, to our dismay there is evidence that mycotoxins and chemical agents are being used in support of Soviet and Soviet proxy interests -- specifically in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia.

While there are readily obtainable, highly lethal pathogens, such as anthrax and Botulinum Clostridium, it is, nevertheless, not trivial to safely and continuously culture large quantities of such microbes, and it is even more difficult to deliver toxins or live organisms as mono-disperse aerosols (some 90% of the droplets being 3-5 microns in size.) Despite such difficulties, it would suffice to have a small team consisting of a Ph.D. microbiologist and few technicians experienced in handling pathogens, an aerosol engineer, a meteorologist and university or research laboratory facilities at hand. Despite claims to the contrary, the development of an atomic bomb is a dangerous and difficult engineering job. By contrast, the capacity to produce biological warfare agents is all too realizable.

NBC agents have both conventional deterrent and unconventional warfare applications. Their deployment could be devastating. A few scenarios seem appropriate. Terrorist groups are unlikely to be interested in mass killing. Yet, because there are few political avenues open to their causes, radical, but technically competent factions, may come to the fore -- organizations which might contemplate serious acts of terror.

Another example, might be the Falklands revisited. Just prior to the British armada having set sail for the Falklands, under some guise a few sailors could have been infected with a hemorrhagic fever which is quite contagious and almost certainly lethal. One could imagine the aircraft carrier Hermes some eight days at sea, an uncontrolled "ghost ship" moving at considerable speed. Though Argentina would have undoubtedly denied it, what would have been a proportionate response? Would Great Britian have targeted Buenos Aires with a hydrogen bomb?

We might also think of terrorists spreading a radio nucleide, say Iodine-131, by means of a janitor's wet mop in front of the Secretary of Defense's office. Prior to discovery, thousands could have been exposed, and adequate clean-up would prove terribly difficult. At extreme, our occupational safety and environmental laws might force the closing of large areas of the Pentagon.

Another example is that of the continuing and debilitating guerrilla operation, such as occurred in Vietnam and is now occurring in Central America. For example, virulent forms of malarial could be carried by a mosquito vector, made sterile by exposure to x-rays. Setting millions of such sterile carriers loose behind our lines could, in the absence of any protective countermeasures, debilitate our forces. Having sterilized the mosquitoes, the disease would not necessarily spread to the opposing forces and there would be little or no proof that biologicals had been used offensively.

Another application of radiological or biological agents is tactical, such as exclusion. Imagine, following a possible Iranian victory over Iraq, Iran (acting in concert with the Soviets) engineers the collapse of the Saudi royal family. To preempt any American attempt to secure the Saudi oil fields, a biologically or radiologically contaminated no-man's zone could be created. American interests might be greatly threatened; today we have little capacity to respond to this unconventional threat -- in time or in scope.

Although the use of biological agents is illegal, if not repugnant, they are easily obtained, extortive tools. At a minimum, Western nations must continue to develop a thorough defensive capacity which includes anti-toxins, vaccines, and protective gear, as well as technical means of rapidly detecting and identifying aerosols of pathogens and waterborne biological agents. But, we will also have to consider developing the appropriate retaliatory means of response to an attack.

e. Military Medicine for Low-Intensity Warfare. The field medical system which has served us through Korea and Vietnam may not continue to be as effective as low-intensity warfare becomes increasingly varied.

Low-intensity warfare, in contrast to the European battlefield conventional warfare, tends to arise and is often mandated by the opponent's terrain, culture, history, economics, and ideology of the opposing sides. The jungles -- urban and rural -- and the desert are natural low-intensity battlegrounds. The development of sophisticated larger weapons systems has been paralleled by an increasing development, indeed a revolution, in

small arms. The advances, which permit simplified automatic fire and high penetration and large-charge hand-held missiles, have complemented the use of traditional back-country homemade weapons typified by the punji stick. The pattern of injury may be the result of high or low velocity missiles, blast, chemical or biological tissue destruction.

The increasing irregularity and fluidity of the combat front, the necessity for deep penetration by very small teams, and the vulnerability of vertical lift rescue aircraft are likely to require a high degree of medical self-sufficiency on the part of our specialized counter-guerrilla units. Remotely directed, sophisticated on-site care may complement or replace early evacuation. The convoyed Medivac helicopter may provide only another vulnerable target for the advanced hand-held weaponry of small opposing units.

An increase in unit medical self-reliance complemented by telemetry-based remote consultation and direction is certainly needed. This can be accomplished by higher levels of training, and more important, the use of highly portable diagnostic and therapeutic equipment which makes optimum use of micro-electronics, miniature electro-mechanical devices, pre-packaged therapy and remote medical control, consultation and direction by specially trained medical doctors. We are close to or have now available hand-held x-ray equipment, miniature sensing and telemetry devices, miniature ventilation systems, and generally improved methods of on-site life support and intermediate therapy.

Specific research in miniaturized diagnostic and therapeutic technology and the attendant "human factors-engineering" is strongly recommended.

MAJOR ARMY LIC ISSUES

A number of significant Army issues related to low-intensity conflict follow from an assessment of the probable world situation, possible military scenarios, and problems of response discussed above. For the purposes of this study, these are cast as flat declarative statements, further supported as appropriate by discussion of subordinate points. It must be underlined here that these deal with the U.S. response to, or proactive use of, low-intensity conflict and do not, except peripherally, apply to the Army as a whole. Of course, the study's general leaning is toward a significant allocation of combat forces to the LIC mission, so the implications of dealing with some of these issues are not minor.

a. The Army should develop a large LIC combat organization. The U.S. Army has become increasingly "heavy." As indicated above, KAI believes that the most realistic forecasts of the future political-military environment to the year 2000 show that the reverse is required generally. To meet the future LIC threat environment, light forces are required most specifically. It is, of course, impossible to develop in this short study the complete structure of the new organization. However, appropriate organizational guidelines are:

- o The basic unit would be the Light Infantry Brigade (LIB).
- o LIB's are not "general purpose forces".
- o LIB's would be configured, equipped and trained for operations in specific regional environments and under relatively narrow scenario specifications.
- o Brigade and battalion Headquarters would be very small.

- o The LIC organization will require a "test bed" with a headquarters and support units on the divisional level.

Presuming the same kind of specializations currently required by SOCOM of its Special Forces, Ranger, Civil Affairs, and psyops units, the LIC organization can be seen, on the whole, to consist of more experienced, veteran soldiers than the rest of the service. This calls for manpower programs that place LIC duty at the top of the Army combat career ladder, that recognize and rely upon the greater physical and psychological maturity of the force, and that instill esprit de corps without damaging that of the rest of the service.

b. LIC doctrine and tactics will lean inherently toward highly decentralized command and small unit independence. Given the quality of manpower presumed above, there is every reason to exploit it fully. Upper echelon commanders will have to have long periods of service in the LIC organization in order to perpetuate this institutional value so successfully relied upon in the recent Israeli and British military actions.

c. For LIC operations at least, the Army requires practical logistic and weaponry independence.

- o The Army needs its own "heavy" lift and penetrator fixed-wing aircraft, in addition to its present complement, in order to move rapidly into any area of the world with "tail-less" LIC forces. We should consider purchase of fast aircraft dedicated to LIC forces for really rapid deployment of light forces. The life on the ground of light infantry can be greatly improved by organizing and training along special operations forces lines; it can be much further improved by the ability to move selected supplies in on a command level integrated at the level of the unit ground commander -- typically the battalion. While this creates, at first, a

perceived roles-and-missions problem with the Air Force, the division of responsibility could be rapidly resolved if general staff reorganization of the military command were to move forward.

- o Complementing fixed-wing heavy-lift aircraft, the LIC Army needs its own direct-support combat aviation. These aircraft should be specialized, as are the Marine Corps Harriers. They would be specifically designed for combined air-ground operations at the low end of the intensity spectrum. Such aircraft can provide the turning point in actions against the expected lightly armored or unarmored vehicles of LIC.
- o The LIC commander needs fixed-wing air assets to extend his intelligence, weapons delivery, and evacuation/mobility reach. The aircraft needed are not high-performance, high upkeep, distantly based Air Force fighters or even Marine Harriers. It seems that something along the lines of a radically improved Pilatus Porter fixed-gear, quiet prop-driven airplane, with lightweight armor to protect the engine, fuel, controls, and crew, could be developed in "knock-down" form for air delivery almost anywhere. It could take off in a STOL mode from bare fields; it could be under-tuned for easy maintenance and repairability; and, with proper strong points, could be a platform for 20mm and 30mm gatlings as well as rocket-launched explosives. This would be a simple airplane, something in concept approaching the WWII Soviet Stormoviks (minimum instrumentation, resistant armor, very low training requirements).
- o The LIC organization needs to be free of weapon and support system interoperability constraints. There is so much to be gained by designing (or buying existing designs) specifically to the LIC mission that it would be militarily wasteful of quality manpower not to do so. Light infantry needs mobility and light weight above all; next, it requires low cost to the point of being able to leave or destroy equipment with no concerns. It must, for example, have light weight, accurate "fire-and-forget" anti-air and anti-armor shoulder-fired rockets; it must avoid laser designators or wire guidance. It must be able to rely on throwaway "Walkman" class inter-unit communications, together with secure satellite relay for command circuits. It must have a full range of modern sabotage, anti-personnel and denial devices at hand, ranging from mines to disguised explosives to aerosols that inhibit internal combustion engine use (this last may be

particularly important in police-type, city-wide or riot situation constraints). One family of weapons and denial devices treated separately above are CBR capabilities which the LIC Army must be prepared to use if such attacks have been initiated by hostile forces.

d. The LIC organization requirements are sufficiently specialized to warrant a separate, independent R&D program.

Looking at the diversity of technical problems equipping the LIC branch poses, and recognizing how far these problems are from the mainline of Defense R&D, it is clear that such problems will not be addressed in a realistic world of limited resources unless an independent institutional base exists from which to do so. The LIC organization has future needs; fleet unmanned air and ground vehicles that can extend an individual unit's sphere of influence or radius of threat by large factors (possibly of three or more); individual and squad mobility systems not dependent on consumable POL for energy; new aircraft; easily controlled or pointed unconventional instruments whose graduated effects range from discomfort to severe trauma (i.e. low frequency sonic projectors, "bang-and-flash", temperature-controlled pulsed water cannon); reliable "low-technology" tools of insurrection and guerrilla warfare, including simple sabotage items). The LIC organization has current needs: wide spectrum CB detection, analysis, and protection; reduced weight small arms ammunition; one-man AA/AT systems; modern versatile payops capability; field-portable RPV's. It must be underlined here that the soldier's best weapon, especially in low-intensity conflict, is his intelligence, and that an important characteristic of such conflict is often the intent to keep that

intensity low (i.e., an anti-escalation bias).^{*} These two aspects would be important determinants of the program and project content of an LIC branch research and development laboratory.

e. LIC doctrine should be developed and taught in advance of the availability of specialized capabilities. While it is clear that new capabilities influence tactics and doctrine, and that doctrine advances to take advantage of new capabilities, in the LIC case it is necessary to move forward boldly and develop future doctrine now. The world won't wait. By focusing today on the least trivial aspects of LIC -- leverage, human intelligence, decentralization, non-escalation, deterrence, psyops -- the Army can develop long-lived doctrine which can be easily expanded to accommodate further changes (organic aviation, new inventions, specialized hardware and software). Unless this begins soon, any one of the earlier scenarios could reach crisis proportion with the Army intellectually and operationally unprepared to act as an instrument of the national will.

The LIC "test bed" organization will require training and doctrine support in the form of :

*The Israeli "Peace for Galilee" operation in June 1983 was "dual sector". The eastern sector operation was limited, high-intensity, conventional combat. The western sector operation was unlimited, low-intensity combat with a large component of UW. The psyops objective in the west was to induce the civilian population to separate itself from the PLO by moving to the beaches. The Israeli psyops included the offer of security, food and shelter on the beaches. Meanwhile the IDF anti-terror units went after the isolated PLO terrorists.

- o An "aggressor manual" which develops potential enemy organization, doctrine, and operations across the spectrum of LIC.
- o Simulations for advanced development of CPX's which will differ radically from the traditional Army command post exercise.
- o Simulations for advanced development of FTX's
- o Simulations for training in Army professional schools for the officers and NCO's assigned early to the test bed unit.

Light infantry brigades will require redundant sets of equipment for LIC in different environments. Although the desert brigade would be trained and equipped for desert operations, some scenarios might require more jungle brigades than normally anticipated. In such a case the desert brigade would draw a set of jungle equipment with which it is at least familiar.

OPTIONAL APPROACHES TO CHANGE

The options available to the Army to correct the aforementioned deficiencies and meet the challenges of low-intensity conflict are limited. This is largely the result of tradition -- not only in the sense of the inability of the Army to reconfigure itself as an institution able to succeed in a new environment, but also in terms of the public perception and definition of the Army's role in past, present and future conflict.

Because of its largely labor-intensive nature, and previous dependence upon conscription as a means of acquiring that labor, the Army has become more closely identified with the public in its collective psyche. To commit the Army is to commit the nation, and this confronts the Army with a serious dilemma when low intensity conflict does not require national commitment, but does demand resources which only the Army can provide.

The other services are more traditionally identified with power projection on a limited basis -- long range bombers on a punitive raid, gunboat diplomacy, and sending in the Marines. Only recently -- since the Korean War -- has the Army considered development of an unconventional or expeditionary force capability. The experience of policing the frontiers -- whether in the Plains, in the Phillipines, or along the Mexican Border -- the Army has not traditionally been defined as "expendable" shock troops, centurions who had signed on to die at the fringes of the empire in defense of the status quo, in the absence of a direct threat which otherwise should galvanize the national will and willingness to serve under arms.

Given this background, the Army has only three viable options for change to prepare itself for the low-intensity conflicts of next two decades.

The first option is to expose its inadequacy and thus be forced into responding to the requirements of the new environment. This is a "post-Vietnam" solution, with all the risks of self-flagellation such an option entails, as in the case of 1970 Army leadership surveys and study.

Can the Army afford to "lose" another low-intensity war, and reasonably expect that a public consensus for reform would exist? After Vietnam, the response was a popular backlash against "adventurism" and a resulting perception that another Vietnam would not be allowed to happen. This produced a rapid and radical Army doctrinal shift toward mid-to-high-intensity conflict in a well understood European setting. Officer professional training, which emphasized counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare by the late 1970s, had been reduced to a half day's instruction. The excellent training infrastructure of "Vietnam villages" was allowed to decay from disuse, because the Army -- at the public insistence -- would not be fighting any more Vietnams.

The irony of all this is that unlike previous conventional military environments, in which generals could be accused of "refighting the last war" instead of preparing for the next, history is likely to repeat itself -- we may end up fighting another "Vietnam" at the fulcrum of the seesaw while the Soviets employ proxies and stand at a great distance. The Soviets seem

to have learned something we have not -- Vietnam provided them with a way to beat us, at virtually no cost to them and at incredible economic, political, military, and even moral cost to America. The Army, just like the nation it defends and the public it reflects, simply defined the threat out of existence. We have done nothing but try to forget what we should have learned from our defeat. There will be more Vietnams because the Soviets know that they can beat us in low-intensity conflict. To prevent this, we simply are going to have to win at LIC, if only to demonstrate to the Soviets that they cannot win (or can make us lose) on the cheap. There is no good reason for the U.S. to "leverage" its foreign and security policies by continuing to operate at the fulcrum of the international see-saw.

The second option would be to attempt to generate political support for organizational change. This option is fraught with dangers. While popular and political support will be critical for any changes in Army structure, it should not drive the process. To permit it to do so, just as occurred in the McNamara years, is to subordinate the Army to defense experts whose experience and education in things military is limited to what they have read or heard. The recent attrition versus maneuver controversy, a dimension of the military reform movement, is an excellent example of opposing adherents jousting on the backs of their personal hobby-horses, without regard to the real problems of what ought to be done, and what can be done. Once again, the threat will be what the Soviets want it to be, and their greatest opportunities lie in low-intensity conflict. The debate regarding Central America notwithstanding, most arguments in

Congress center on how to fight the wars least likely to occur; (e.g., maneuver vs. attrition in Europe) because that is politically palatable. After all, while it costs a lot of money, who cares; the public really does not expect or fear a war in Europe anyway. Even in the 1950s, in the wake of Korea and the Chinese hordes, the notion of wars with the Soviets conjured up images of nuclear holocaust. What was genuinely feared was what was called "communist subversion," or the ability of the Soviets to indirectly (in every sense, the Liddel-Hart notion of indirect strategy) defeat democratic and transitional nations by means other than conventional war. The lesson of Korea was that the Soviets would rather fight a proxy war on the periphery rather than a conventional war in the center. They learned, by losing there, that mid-intensity conflict would not work for them because the potential costs and risks of escalation would outweigh any benefits. In Vietnam, they proved that low-intensity conflict would work against the American democracy.

This leaves only one option -- that the Army confront and seek to repair its own shortcomings, and thus to be "guilty" in the public eye of looking for the next war. This will not be easy, since it will require an Army leadership possessed of a degree of both creativity and moral courage far in excess of what is normally seen. It will require that the Army shed some of its own traditions, prerogative and prejudices, and look forward to fighting the next, rather than the last, war. This will demand that:

- o The Army accept evaluations of what the nature of the conflict will be;

- o New doctrine be developed to win not lose that war;
- o And new organizational initiatives be developed to build a force capable of executing such a doctrine.

Unlike any other conflict, low-intensity war demands a degree of sophistication heretofore unseen in the Army. Army responses must be:

- o effective -- accomplish the mission.
- o efficient -- do so at the lowest resource expenditure
- o appropriate -- and in a way which suits the political environment and furthers U.S. interests.

These concepts are interrelated. Effectiveness is self-evident, but presupposes that the goals of military action and standards for their accomplishment are adequately defined. Efficiency is necessary not only because of resource constraints, but also because low-intensity conflict is protracted, and will most likely reemerge elsewhere, once contained or conquered initially. When, where and how the conflict emerges are important variables in determining response, but not as critical as the realization that the struggle may continue indefinitely, a notion alien to the American approach to "war". Appropriateness is important not only because it insures success, but because it is the prerequisite of victory in low-intensity conflict. Restoration or maintenance of the status quo will, in the future, be insufficient -- the Army must take actions which anticipate conflicts and in operation enhance American interests regionally and globally. In other words, to win is to make things better than before, not just the same as before.

These factors acknowledge both the preconditions which allow low-intensity conflict to emerge, and the experience of previous successful unconventional military operations. Security assistance (including support of "proxies"), special operations (including overt, special intelligence operations), civic action, psychological operations, and direct military intervention all take on special significance in such a context. They form interrelated parts of a strategy for an effective, efficient, appropriate response to low-intensity conflict.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are indications that the senior Army leadership has recognized at a high level of generalization that the most likely forms of future conflict will require capabilities the Army does not now possess. The call in the FY 84 Defense Posture Statement for expanded Special Operations Forces is only one of several indicators. Yet, little can be done to acquire requisite capabilities until the problem has been defined. Establishing more SOFs without objectives to be pursued, Army missions for which organizations are to be structured and tasked, and doctrine and training needed to prepare units and individuals for achievement of these objectives, is akin to marching off rapidly in unknown directions never doubting one's ability to get there. Quite correctly, the Army (and OSD) have responded to the failure of Desert I by concentration on the DELTA Team and acquisition of capabilities for hostage retrievals and related missions. But hostage seizures will constitute only one rivulet of the threats to U.S. interests posed by LIC.

Army operators as well as planners tend to focus on the familiar, traditional Army missions. Indeed, the RDJTF continues to prepare for the traditional, including the SOf's now assigned to or earmarked for the RDJTF. The Army manual on low-intensity conflict provides doctrine based on a distillation of a 10 to 15 year old experience in Vietnam. It assumes an amicable, if not well-trained, host susceptible to U.S. influence in creating internal defense and development capabilities.

Such assumptions are unrealistic. The Army must be prepared to accomplish simultaneously or in concert, a wide range of missions including sophisticated political-military analyses, overt intelligence collection, civic action, long-range surgical strikes (on the Shaba model), raids, rescues, escape and evasion, personnel snatches, counterterrorism, security assistance management, mobile training teams, interdiction, sabotage insurgency, stay-behind forces, counter-insurgency, psychological operations, resistance formation and long-range reconnaissance, to name a few.

The Army needs to recognize that the worst thing it can do (and appears ready to do now) is to expand the size of its elite forces too rapidly, thus watering down quality and any justifiable basis for their status. Early on in Southeast Asia, the public "adored" Special forces -- Roger Donlon, JFK and the "Ballad of the Green Berets"; yet within a few years they were seen as "creatures" of the CIA or "hit men."

While much of this change may be attributed to disillusionment with the war, some of it was derived from the fact that SOF had changed, and that the Army had failed to define its role and therefore the public's role in Vietnam.

Instead of fighting subversion through dedication and inherent goodness (and they were good, highly trained, motivated soldiers -- "America's best"), their "virtue" was diluted as the war and SOF expanded and became more and more involved in covert operations.

This is not to say that such operations were not, are not, and will not be necessary. It is simply to point out that the

public will not accept the idea of its Army fighting anything other than a "splendid little war." Put succinctly, the attitude is that soldier should be soldiers, and spooks should be spooks. By failing to adequately define its role in low-intensity conflict, the Army has failed to engender popular support for fighting and winning such a war. Winning such support for the future may have to entail a domestic public affairs effort akin to advertising or marketing.

If the Army chooses to respond positively to the LIC challenge -- in terms of recognizing the challenge itself, creating doctrine, providing training, organizing and equipping to meet it, and fitting the reordered priorities within the already overconstrained resources envelope -- then the Army is faced with choosing the particular approach that will provide the greatest assurance that changes will come about with the least loss of command flexibility and departmental independence. Essentially, there appear to be three rather different ways in which the Army can address this question.

First, the Army can confront the problem squarely and seek to institute changes and repairs under the harsh illumination of domestic and allied scrutiny. This is the easiest to describe, and perhaps the hardest to accomplish. It means an overt restructure of forces away from the Fulda Gap and toward the Ogaden, the empty Quarter and the Caribbean. It means careful disengagement from the high-tech, high-cost, high-quality Airland Army commitments upon which the allies have depended, and a renewed commitment to the Army as an instrument of U.S. policy

with a "360 degrees target zone" -- in support of all, not just a selected few, of America's political and military objectives. There is no question that this route runs through rough terrain. Political and institutional ambushes lie at every hand. The Defense Department is unlikely to welcome changes of this magnitude and scope. Other Services are likely to react only with concern for mission and resource turf, especially when threatened with spill-over changes to accommodate a redirected Army. The Congress, already suspicious in the light of the past decade of cost and force disinformation, and now blase' about new world views, strategies, and threat analyses, is unlikely to become an instant enthusiast for a new Army posture which, admittedly reflects greater readiness and capability for military action than does its predecessor. The White House, whatever party may be in charge, reacts catatonically to open, straightforward, unmanipulated policy review and new directions. Initially, the U.S. public is likely to wonder whether the Army is intent on becoming Praetorian. And the "rest" of the Army, the "traditional" elements not participating (except through dilution of power) in the LIC revolution, is likely to use its not inconsiderable experience in political infighting to preserve the status quo.

Second, the Army can maneuver to gain the political support of at least one or more major power blocs to provide cover and flank support as the Army goes about the restructuring process. This approach requires greater sustainability, longer time, and some sharing of authority with commensurate reduction in policy autonomy. The Army, for example, would need the alliance of OSD

to fend off inter-service issues and to carry the fight to the OMB and the White House. The Army could share a common cause with the Congress in its perpetual battle with an incomprehensible DoD budget, force structure, and strategic doctrine. The Army could even seek a real "grassroots" commitment to change in the American public at large -- that public who would feel more secure in a new Army. Whatever political ally the Army might seek, this option is time-consuming and still uncertain of success. There is no assurance that the combined forces in potential opposition to an expanded LIC Army would not prevail in the bureaucratic and media melees sure to flow from this option.

The third option is the obverse of the first. By persistent, open, factual presentation of the incongruence between missions and doctrine, between probable wars and current force structure, the Army can make it clear to the Executive, the Congress and the public that, under current force structure and doctrine, it cannot protect and advance the most likely range of real U.S. future interests. The message stops there; properly orchestrated, it forces the listener, not the Army, to take the next intellectual and political steps. Given the lack of a defense consensus (at least until 1986-87), the Army would need to be especially careful not to advocate missions and resources in addition to those in hand. The key is to force the policy decision machinery to recognize the stark choices -- and to make the right ones. Under this option the Army retains current structural integrity until its external leadership (including the

public) join in a new consensus on what the Army should be. A dedicated Army then restructures itself in accordance with the new mandate. The pitfalls here, of course, parallel those in the other options. The process takes time -- and there is no assurance the correct decision will be reached for whatever reason.

Recommendations. The Army should act now to be able to accommodate to the future realities of the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum. The Army should proceed on a dual track to develop internal and external support for the kind of changes needed. A hard-hitting, sophisticated information campaign would be required to convert public and policy attitudes away from the conventional wisdom (Fulda Gap and RDJTF) and toward the new philosophy of the Army as the political instrument of choice within a broad range of violence intensity. By the early 1990s, this would be coupled with the forced draft of reservists, in-depth development of organization, doctrine, and tactics, and of a new training program ready to implement upon receipt of Congressional and Executive approval. The organization of the army for LIC should center on a new combat organization that integrates current Special Forces, Ranger, Civil Affairs, psyops, FAO, and present light forces with necessary new forces. This organization should have integral aviation capabilities for both penetrating transport and close-in tactical support. This organization should have integral R&D capability, supporting LIC both in program and laboratory facility terms. The doctrine for LIC should reflect the major points developed thus far -- decentralization of command, high reliance on small unit

initiative to meet sophisticated political objectives, proactive as well as reactive policy, and logistical independence. The spectrum of appropriate tactics should be dramatically expanded to recognize the downside range of low-intensity military activities, to include innovative NBC use for defense and retaliation, and to prepare for the domestic city battlefield. Professional education and training should be restructured to gradually incorporate more and more intellectual and practical breadth (as well as technical, language, and political specialization) into a new organization curriculum in order not to dilute but to capitalize on the already very high morale, unit pride, and military capability of SOCOM forces. The Army should consider a organizational name that has useful, emotional value and that projects a broader, constructive image of elite superiority. "Grenadier," "dragoon," "legionnaire," and "musketeer" are all in this category.

None of this will be easy. Any proposal calling for a change from the status quo bears the burden of proof that 1) there is a real problem over the horizon; 2) current Army organization, doctrine, training, and equipment cannot solve the problem; 3) the proposal can solve the problem better than any other alternative proposal; and 4) the proposal will not create spinoff problems worse than the main problem to be solved.

This study recognizes the enormous political and institutional barriers inherent in a wholesale restructuring of the Army establishment. That this restructuring will eventually have to come to pass is a conclusion of the study; there appears

to be, however, an approach which will lessen tensions while taking a first positive step toward the future. If the Army were to commit an entire active division to development and test of LIC doctrine, practices, and equipment, there would be no question as to the seriousness of commitment while at the same time only affecting less than 10% of the active force. It is therefore recommended that the Army immediately "lighten" its high-technology division, combine it with some elements of expanded SOCOM forces, and commit it as a full-scale pilot model for the LIC mission. Given the force's size, acquiring (through purchase, exchange, loan, or other agreement) most of the necessary integral new equipment should not pose extraordinary difficulties -- improvisation in the aviation area should be particularly rewarding, given the very large international market from which to pick. By developing doctrine and tactics "as you go", that is, in the course of continuing large-scale maneuvers and field exercises over all terrain and weather conditions, the Army can maintain a running assessment of two critical points: its readiness to operate responsively to LIC/UW conditions, and its readiness to move forward with an overall reorganization.

The LIC mission is real -- and the Army is not fundamentally prepared to meet it. Big, difficult steps are necessary to remedy this condition. The smallest and still significant step recommended here, is a "pilot program" converting a high-tech division into the seed-bed of an eventual new LIC combat organization.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Low-intensity conflict is not a clear concept. Definitions that emerge in the attached bibliography are all over the political-military landscape. Does low-intensity mean non-nuclear combat, warfare that takes place in the Third World, or is it conflict that occurs on the periphery of U.S. security interests? Sarkesian points out that there is little agreement, though he suggests that the most important distinction is the one between the soldier and the policy maker. And the most important consensus is that it is more important to be able to respond than it is to be able to define.

Underlying the discussion of low-intensity conflict is the question of whether it can become a useful policy tool for the United States government. The Taylor-Maaranen book shows how the ability to deal with low-intensity conflict contingencies is absolutely essential. Ryan's study of attempted rescue missions demonstrate the value that a low intensity conflict capability can have when rescue missions actually work.

This is not a surprising observation, because if "guerilla warfare" or "counter-insurgency" or "limited war" is substituted for low-intensity conflict then it appears as though the value of such a capability has been

demonstrated many times over. In this bibliography, recent books are covered, but it seems as though low-intensity conflict is just the current name for a set of issues that would seem all too familiar under another rubric.

Common wisdom holds that low-intensity conflict will occur in the Third and Developing worlds in the 1980s and beyond. Therefore Arlinghaus's book is very useful because it sets the scene for Africa in a very straight-forward manner. Schlesinger's Adelphi Paper is also right on target because it establishes guidance for U.S. policy toward these risk areas. If Schlesinger's advice works then the weapons in Africa pose less of a problem for American decision makers. The Kolodziej-Harkavy book presents a view of the world through the security spectacles of fourteen developing nations. The combination of these books and the Schlesinger paper leave little to the imagination in describing the political-military nature of the low-intensity battlefield in the 1980s. Regional conflict projections in the Taylor-Maaranen book offer explicit scenarios for this type of war.

One element that is less clear in these readings is the question of what constitutes victory in an age where ambiguity is increasing rather than decreasing. Freedman points out that even though the Falklands War was wrapped in a political straightjacket, the war itself had a coherent beginning, a recognizable middle and an ending that everyone

is able to understand even if they can't accept it. Summers reinforces the importance of clear goals in his study of the Vietnam war. One conclusion is that low-intensity conflict is less of a problem for the military than it is for the civilian leaders who have control over policy. But only if the leaders can develop objectives and goals and muster the political moxy to stick by their decisions can the military then do their job with any degree of effectiveness.

Several books offer insights into the approach taken by other countries. Kaplan's book does a thorough job on the Soviet Union. Hart's article supports Kaplan with an impressive display of Soviet sources. The Newells's book is basically one large case study of low-intensity conflict in Afghanistan. Jacques Pons in the Sarkesian-Scully book reveals that in France intervention is kept within the parameters of policy because forces are not designed to go anywhere and do everything; rather they are designed to support but never to exceed the needs of French foreign policy. If Pons is right then France should be a positive model for U.S. activities.

Record suggests that the RDJTF is a creature of bureaucratic competition and is therefore inadequate for low-intensity conflict missions that could occur in the Persian Gulf region. Paddock shows that this problem is not so new; the Army has tried to cope with unconventional threats for

thirty years yet seems to run head-on into structural restraints every time a solution seems to be at hand. The RDJTF appears to be the most recent edition of a product that has had design flaws for a long time.

One issue that has not received a great deal of attention is the following: under what circumstances can policy makers expect the American public to support low intensity conflict? Will an American president be able to sustain support for a "small war" that is guaranteed to remain politically ambiguous and geographically remote? The literature surveyed for this bibliography touches every base adequately with the exception of this one.

- 1) Low-intensity conflict annotated bibliography
- 2) Bibliographies on:
 - a. Unconventional Warfare
 - b. Limited War
 - c. Psychological Operations
 - d. Counter-insurgency & Guerrilla Warfare
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